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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU280, US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#03KATHMANDU280**.

| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| 03KATHMANDU280 | 2003-02-14 05:16 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Kathmandu |

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1538395.ece>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000280

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [IN](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
NEPAL

REF: A. A. 02 NEW DELHI 6938 B. B. NEW DELHI 267 C. C. NEW DELHI 641

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASONS: 1.5 (B AND D)

- ¶1. (C) Summary: US security assistance to Nepal has brought the ancillary advantage to the US of providing a new arena for fruitful US-Indian
 - ¶2. (C) DCM and DATT met on February 4 with their Indian counterparts to discuss issues raised by the Indian Ambassador concerning US sales of
 - ¶3. (C) DCM and DATT began the discussion by explaining the complexity of the US security assistance process, emphasizing that none of the mone
 - ¶4. (C) The Indian DCM, Ashok Kumar, agreed readily with the DCM's characterization of the speed and volume of Indian security assistance to Ne
 - ¶5. (C) The DCM and DATT countered by explaining that the USG is not pushing M16s on the Nepali Government. After our current FMF appropriatic
 - ¶6. (C) The DATT asked how the GOI proposed that the USG should approach the M16 issue with Nepal. After a pause with no answer from the Indiar
 - ¶7. (C) In conclusion the DCM pointed out that the US values its strengthening military-to-military relationship with India and has no desire t
 - ¶8. (S/NF) Comment: Our frequent discussions with our Indian diplomatic colleagues here in Kathmandu are inconsistent in tone. Ambassador Shyaz
 - ¶9. (C) On February 11 our DATT was told that the Indian Embassy had placed a hold on the delivery of additional INSAS rifles, although the Emt
 - ¶10. Conclusions we tentatively have drawn from the discussion summarized above and numerous others like it are the following:
 - (C) The GOI, like the USG, is attempting to be responsive to Nepali requests for modern combat rifles as an urgent priority. What is frustr
 - (C) Indian analysts are increasingly persuaded that the Maoist movement in Nepal poses a security threat to India. Their dilemma is that the
 - (C) Indian attitudes toward US security assistance to Nepal are complex. On the one hand, they are pleased by the growing transparency and
 - (S/NF) At least in Kathmandu, Indian concern about US arms sales to Nepal appears to vary significantly between its civilian and military re
 - ¶11. (C) Comment. The best information we have seen on Maoist thinking indicates that the US and UK's announced policy of military assistance
- MALINOWSKI